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Fransen: Comparative Negligence Practice in Wyoming

COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE PRACTICE
IN WYOMING
I. INTRODUCTION

The Wyoming legislature initiated a new era in tort law in
Wyoming in 1973. Statutes were enacted in that year that set
up a system of comparative negligence in Wyoming.1 The
statutes set out the principle of comparative negligence and
provided for a system of contribution among those found jointly liable in tort.2 The effect of a settlement negotiated by one
or more potentially liable parties was also defined by the new
statutes.3 Dissatisfaction with the provisions relating to contribution and settlement led to substantial changes in those
provisions in 1977. 4 The basic rule of comparative negligence
has, however, remained unchanged since 1973. 5
Copyright@ 1983 by the University of Wyoming.
1. 1973 Wyo. SEss. LAWS Ch. 67, S 1. For historical material relating to the 1973 enactments, see Comment, ComparativeNegligence in Wyoming, 8 LAND & WATER L. REV.
597 (1973); Comment, Wyoming Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors, 9 LAND &
WATER L. REV. 589 (1974).
2. Wyo. STAT. SS 1-7.2 to -7.4 (Supp. 1975).
3. WYO. STAT. S 1-7.5 to -7.6 (Supp. 1975).
4. 1977 Wyo. SESS. LAWS Ch. 188, S 1. The current statutes, found at Wyo. STAT. SS
1-1-110 to -113 (1977), provide:
1 1-110. Right to contribution amoung joint tortfeasors.
(a) Except as otherwise provided in W.S. 1-1-110 through 1-1-113, where
two (2) or more persons become jointly or severally liable in tort for the same
injury to person or property or for the same wrongful death, there is a right of
contribution among them even though judgment has not been recovered
against any or all of them.
(b) The right of contribution exists only in favor of a tortfeasor who has
paid more than his pro rata share of the common liability, and his total recovery
is limited to the amount paid by him in excess of his pro rata share. No tortfeasor is compelled to make contribution beyond his own pro rata share of the
entire liability.
(c) There is no right of contribution in favor of any tortfeasor who has intentionally, willfully or wantonly caused or contributed to the injury or
wrongful death.
(d) A tortfeasor who enters into a settlement with a claimant is not entitled
to recover contribution from another tortfeasor whose liability for the injury or
wrongful death is not extinguished by the settlement nor in respect to any
amount paid in a settlement which is in excess of what was reasonable.
(e) A liability insurer, who by payment has discharged in full or in part the
liability of an insured tortfeasor and has discharged in full its obligation as insurer, is subrogated to the insured tortfeasor's right of contribution to the extent of the amount it has paid in excess of the insured tortfeasor's pro rata
share of the common liability. This provision does not limit or impair any right
of the subrogation arising from any other relationship.
(f) W.S. 1-1 -110 through 1-1-113 do not impair any right of indemnity under
existing law. Where one (1) tortfeasor is entitled to indemnity from another,
the right of the indemnity obligee is for indemnity and not contribution, and the
indemnity obligor is not entitled to contribution from the obligee for any portion of his indemnity obligation.
(g) W.S. 1-1-110 through 1-1-113 do not apply to breaches of trust or of
other fiduciary obligation.
(h) W.S. 1-1-110 through 1-1-113 do not affect the common law liability of
the several joint tortfeasors to have judgments recovered and payment made
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from them individually by the injured person for the whole injury. The
recovery of a judgment by the injured person against one (1) joint tortfeasor does not discharge the other joint tortfeasors, from liability to the
injured party.
5 1-1-111. Pro rata shares.
In determining the pro rata shares of tortfeasors in the entire liability:
(i) The relative degrees of fault of the joint tortfeasors shall be considered in determining their pro rata shares solely for the purpose of
determining their rights of contribution among themselves, each remaining severally liable to the injured person for the whole injury as at common
law;
(ii) If equity requires, the collective liability of some as a group shall
constitute a single share;
(iii) A final verdict in favor of an alleged joint tortfeasor as against the
injured party shall be a conclusive determination that such successful party is not liable to make contribution to any other tortfeasor.
5 1-1-112. Enforcement.
(a) Whether or not judgment has been entered in an action against two (2)
or more tortfeasors for the same injury or wrongful death, contribution may be
enforced by separate action.
(b) Where a judgment has been entered in an action against two (2) or more
tortfeasors for the same injury or wrongful death, contribution may be enforced in that action by judgment in favor of one (1) against other judgment defendants by motion upon notice to all parties to the action.
(c) If there is a judgment for the injury or wrongful death against the tortfeasor seeking contribution, any separate action by him to enforce contribution
shall be commenced within one (1) year after the judgment has become final by
lapse of time for appeal or the decision on appeal has become final.
(d) If there is no judgment for the injury or wrongful death against the tortfeasor seeking contribution, his right of contribution is barred unless he has
either:
(i) Discharged by payment the common liability within the statute of
limitations period applicable to claimant's right of action against him and
has commenced his action for contribution within one (1) year after payment; or
(ii) Agreed while action is pending against him to discharge the common liability and has within one (1) year after the agreement paid the
liability and commenced his action for contribution.
(e) The recovery of a judgment for an injury or wrongful death against one
(1) tortfeasor does not of itself discharge the other tortfeasors from liability for
the injury or wrongful death unless the judgment is satisfied. The satisfaction
of the judgment does not impair any right of contribution.
(f) The judgment determining the liability of the several defendants to the
claimant for an injury or wrongful death is binding as among defendants in
determining their right to contribution.
5 1-1-113. Release or covenant not to sue.
(a) When a release or a covenant not to sue or not to enforce judgment is
given in good faith to one (1) of two (2) or more persons liable in tort for the
same injury or wrongful death:
(i) It does not discharge any of the other tortfeasors from liability for
the injury or wrongful death unless its terms so provide; but it reduces the
claim against the others to the extent of any amount stipulated by the
release or the covenant, or in the amount of the consideration paid for it,
whichever is the greater; and
(ii) It discharges the tortfeasor to whom it is given from all liability for
contribution to any other tortfeasor.
5. Wyo. STAT. S 1-1-109 (1977). This section was amended in 1977 to add subsection (bXiii)
which provides for juries in comparative negligence cases to be informed of the consequences of their determinations of negligence. 1977 Wyo. SEss. LAWS Ch. 188, S 1. The
statute presently provides:
(a) Contributory negligence shall not bar a recovery in an action by any person or his legal representative to recover damages for negligence resulting in
death or in injury to person or property, if the contributory negligence was not
as great as the negligence of the person against whom recovery is sought. Any
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The adoption of comparative negligence serves its most
important purpose in suspending the common law rule that a
plaintiff's contributory negligence, no matter how slight, completely bars any recovery based on a cause of action in tort.
Under the Wyoming rule of comparative negligence the plaintiff can recover from any defendant who is more negligent
than himself. 6 In the simple one plaintiff, one defendant case
the rule is easily applied and the results are straightforward. If
the jury determines that both parties were negligent, the total
negligence is simply assigned to each party on a percentage
basis. Whether the plaintiff will recover and how much he will
recover are determined by the jury's allocation of negligence.
If the percentage of negligence assigned to the plaintiff is
equal to or greater than the percentage assigned to the defendant, the plaintiff will recover nothing.7 The plaintiff will
recover when his negligence is found to be less than the
negligence of the defendant, but the recovery is reduced by the
amount of the plaintiff's negligence. Thus, if the plaintiff is
assigned 49% of the causal negligence and the defendant is
assigned 51%, the plaintiff will recover only 51% of the
amount of his damages. 8 Comparative negligence in the two
party case is an uncomplicated, intuitively fair scheme.
Unfortunately, many, and perhaps most, tort actions involve more than two parties. When multiple plaintiffs seek to
recover from multiple defendants and counterclaims and crossclaims are filed, determining whose negligence to compare can
be difficult. Further complications arise when it is necessary to
damages allowed shall be diminished in proportion to the amount of negligence
attributed to the person recovering.
(b) The court may, and when requested by any party shall:
(i) If a jury trial, direct the jury to find special verdicts;
(ii) If a trial before the court without jury, make special findings of
fact, determining the amount of damages and the percentage of
negligence attributable to each party. The court shall then reduce the
amount of such damages in proportion to the amount of negligence attributed to the person recovering;
(iii) Inform the jury of the consequences of its determination of the
percentage of negligence.
6. Wyo. STAT. S 1-1-109(a) (1977) provides in pertinent part:
(a) Contributory negligence shall not bar a recovery ... if the contributory
negligence was not as great as the negligence of the person against whom
recovery is sought ....
(emphasis added).
Notice that this language prohibits recovery where the plaintiff's negligence is equal to
that of the defendant.
7. WYO. STAT. S 1-1-109(a) (1977).
8. Brittain v. Booth, 601 P.2d 532, 533 (Wyo. 1979).
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determine the respective parties' rights to contribution and
the effect a settlement may have on the rights of non-settling
parties. As if that weren't enough, the application of the rule
of comparative negligence is also affected by, and affects the
validity of, such tort concepts as last clear chance, obvious
danger and vicarious liability.
This comment will address problems related to multiple
parties, contribution, settlement, and certain basic tort concepts, with particular reference to the law of Wyoming. In
some areas, where Wyoming law is uncertain, the law of other
states is looked to as a guide. Hopefully, the reader will be
more enlightened than confused by this effort. The first
endeavor will be to examine the workings of the basic
machinery in a multiple party comparative negligence case.
II. MULTIPLE PARTIES

A. Basic Procedures
In any action involving multiple parties the initial problem
which must be confronted is that of deciding whose negligence
is to be compared, and upon what terms. Consider the least
complex situation, in which a single plaintiff (P) sues two
defendants (D1 and D,). Whether P may recover can be determined in two ways. The negligence of D 1 and D 2 can be combined and compared to P's negligence 9 or the negligence of D 1
and D2 can be individually compared to P's negligence. The latter method of comparison, known as the "Wisconsin Rule" has
been adopted in Wyoming. 10
The specific language of the Wyoming comparative
negligence statute calls for a one-on-one comparison of the
parties' negligence. The statute provides that recovery by
"any person" is not barred so long as his contributory
negligence is not as great as the negligence "of the person"
against whom recovery is sought."
9. This approach is known as the "Arkansas Rule." Board of County Comm'rs v. Ridenour,
623 P.2d 1174, 1181 (Wyo. 1981), reh'g denied, 627 P.2d 163 (Wyo. 1981).
10. Id. at 1183. The first record of the application of the "Wisconsin Rule" under the Wyoming statutes appears in Global Van Lines, Inc. v. Nebeker, 541 F.2d 865, 867 (10th Cir.
1976).
11. Board of County Comm'rs v. Ridenour, 623 P.2d at 1138 (Wyo. 1981); WYO. STAT. S
1-1-109(a) (1977).
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When the plaintiff's negligence is compared to that of each
individual defendant, recovery is determined by the same
criteria as in the two-party case discussed in the introduction.
That is, the plaintiff may not recover against any individual
defendant who is not more negligent than the plaintiff. 12 All
defendants against whom the plaintiff is allowed to recover are
jointly and severally liable for the plaintiff's damages. 13 The
amount of the plaintiff's recovery is in all cases reduced by the
14
amount of his own negligence.
The rule is easily illustrated by use of a hypothetical.
Assume the following percentages of negligence: P-30%;
D,-20%; D 2-50%. The plaintiff can recover from D 2 only. D, incurs no liability since his negligence is less than P's. D 2 is
severally liable for P's entire damages less 30%-the amount
of P's negligence. Notice that P's recovery is never reduced by
the amount of any other party's negligence. Rather, P's
recovery is reduced only by the amount of his own negligence.
Adding another plaintiff actually results in no significant
increase in the complexity of the comparison process. The
same rules apply and each plaintiff's negligence is compared to
that of the other parties individually to determine if he can
recover. Comparisons are made with every party against
whom a claim exists.' 5 As before, if a plaintiff can recover, he
can recover his damages decreased by the percentge of his own
negligence. His recovery is not diminished by the negligence of
any other party, plaintiff or defendant.' 6
Once again, a hypothetical will help illustrate the procedure. Assume the following percentages of negligence:
P1-25%, P 2-15%, D1-35%, D 2-25%. Both plaintiffs will recover.
P, will recover his damages, reduced by 25%, from D, since P
is less negligent than D1.P, cannot recover from D 2 because P,
12. Board of County Comm'rs v. Ridenour, 623 P.2d at 1189 (Wyo. 1981) (quoting Walker v.
Kroger Grocery & Baking Co., 214 Wis. 519, 252 N.W. 721, 727-28 (1934)).
13. Id.; Wyo. STAT. S1-1-110(h) (1977). It should be noted that the hypothetical posed by the
court in Ridenour describes the operation of the "Arkansas Rule" and as such is not a
statement of the law in Wyoming. 623 P.2d at 1186.
14. Board of County Comm'rs v. Ridenour, 623 P.2d at 1189 (Wyo. 1981) (quoting Walker v.
Kroger Grocery & Baking Co., 252 N.W. at 727-28 (1934)); Wyo. STAT. S 1-1-109(a)
(1977).
15. Board of County Comrn'rs v. Ridenour, 623 P.2d at 1189 (Wyo. 1981) (quoting Walker v.
Kroger Grocery & Baking, 252 N.W. at 727-28 (1934)).
16. Id.
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is not less negligent than D 2. P 2 will recover his damages,
reduced by 15%, from D, and D2 since P 2 is less negligent than
either of them. There is no double recovery since P 2 will have a
single judgment for which D, and D 2 will be jointly and severally liable.
Recovery on proper cross-claims or counterclaims is deter17
mined on the same basis as the original claims in the action.
In the hypothetical above, P2 would have a judgment against
all three of the other parties to the action of he had crossclaimed against P 1.
The rules discussed thus far are the very basic elements of
the comparative negligence system in Wyoming. However, the
hypotheticals are uniquely void of any real world complications
and, as the reader has probably already observed, they depend
upon some implicit assumptions. Every person causally
negligent was assumed to be a party, and every party was
assumed to be subject to liability as a matter of law if the comparison of negligence dictated liability. All of the parties were
assumed to be causally negligent and finally, each party's
damages were assumed to have been the result of the same
negligent acts. We are now going to leave those assumptions
behind and try to impose some order upon the jumble that is
thereby created.
Understanding the discussion which follows may be less
difficult if the reader conceptualizes the determination of the
plaintiff's right to recover as a two-step process. First,
negligence is apportioned among the proper individuals; second, negligence is compared to determine whether, against
whom, and how much the plaintiff may recover. The first step
will be referred to as "apportionment," the second as "comparison." Two other terms deserve attention at this point.
"Party" is used in a strict sense to refer only to named parties
to an action. Any person who is causally connected to the occurrence giving rise to the action, but who is not a party, will
be referred to as a non-party actor or NPA.18
17. See Global Van Lines, Inc. v. Nebeker, 541 F.2d at 866-67 (10th Cir. 1976). Logically, any
party to a comparative negligence action who has been injured does well to file any
reasonable cross-claim or counterclaim on the chance that some other party will be found
to be more negligent than he.
18. ABC Builders, Inc. v. Phillips, 632 P.2d 925, 934 n.9 (Wyo. 1981).
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B. Non-parties and partiesnot liable
A non-party actor may not be joined for any of a number of
reasons. He may have settled the plaintiff's claim against him,
relieving him of any liability. 19 He may be out of the jurisdiction or he may be unknown. 20 Finally, it may simply be that
none of the parties wishes to join him in the action. 21 Whatever
the reason for his absence, the question presented is what to do
with his possible negligence. The answer provided by the
Wyoming Supreme Court is clear. "The jury must ascertain
of negligence of all participants to an
the percentage
2P 2
occurrence."
With respect to the non-party actor, the jury is placed in
the difficult position of having to assign a percentage of
negligence to a person who is not a party to the action, and
who is not present in court. Of course, the non-party actor is
not bound by the jury's determination of his degree of fault.23
Neither does the non-party actor's negligence have any direct
influence upon any party's ability to recover in the action. No
comparison is made between any party's negligence and the
negligence of the non-party actor because no recovery is
sought from him. The non-party actor's negligence influences
the parties' rights to recover indirectly, in that the non-party
actor's negligence is considered in apportioning shares of
causal negligence among the persons whose negligence caused
the injury for which recovery is sought.2 4 Logically, if a nonparty actor has some responsibility for the injury and his
negligence is not considered, the parties will somehow be
assigned a certain amount of negligence above their fair share.
Therefore, the non-party actor's negligence must be considered in order to achieve a fair apportionment of negligence.
Assume P brings an action against D, and D 2 , and a third
likely defendant, NPA, cannot be found. If the jury is to assign
19. Board of County Comm'rs v. Ridenour, 623 P.2d at 1192 n.14 (Wyo. 1981).
20. The unknown actor or so called "phantom driver" has been recognized in some jurisdictions. HEFT AND HEFr, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE MANUAL, Appendix II (Supp. 1982).
The question has not been addressed by the Wyoming Supreme Court.
21. Harris v. Grizzle, 599 P.2d 580, 585 (Wyo. 1977). But see Board of County Comm'rs v.
Ridenour, 623 P.2d at 1192 n.14 (Wyo. 1981).
22. Board of County Comm'rs v. Ridenour, 623 P.2d at 1188 (Wyo. 1981) (emphasis added).
23. Palmeno v. Cashen, 627 P.2d 163, 166 (Wyo. 1981).
24. Board of County Comm'rs v. Ridenour, 623 P.2d at 1189 (Wyo. 1981).
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100% of the negligence causing P's injury, it must consider the
negligence of P 1, D1 , D 2, and NPA. Suppose that negligence is
apportioned: P-10%, D 1-15%, D 2-15%, and NPA-60%. NPA's
negligence does not affect the relationship among the parties
for purposes of comparison. P will have a judgment against D,
and D2 for 90% of his damages. NPA is not bound by the outcome and has no liability to any party as a result of the action.
A situation analogous to that of the non-party actor arises
when one of the parties to the action cannot, as a matter of
law, be liable to one or more of the other parties. That party's
percentage of negligence is considered by the jury in apportioning negligence, just as is the non-party actor's.2 5
The rule is that the causal negligence of every person involved in the occurrence giving rise to an action is considered
for the purpose of apportioning negligence, whether or not he
is a party to the action or is immune from liability.
C. Causal Relationships
The most difficult problems in apportioning negligence occur when all of the parties to the action do not suffer damages
as a result of the same causal negligence. The classic example
of this problem is the "active and passive" negligence distinction. 6 This distinction typically arises in cases involving
automobile drivers and passengers. A passenger in an
automobile may be negligent with respect to his own safety if
he consents to ride with an obviously intoxicated driver. But
the passenger's negligence does not have any causal connection to the injuries received by another automobile driver with
whom the intoxicated driver collides. 2 7 All three persons (the
two drivers and the passenger) are injured in the same event,
but not all of their injuries stem from the same cause. For that
reason it is improper to simply assign each a percentage of
negligence and compare their negligence to determine liability. 28 What must be done is to sort out the different causal relationships and make a separate apportionment of negligence for
each.29
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Beard v. Brown, 616 P.2d 726, 738 (Wyo. 1980).
Board of County Comm'rs v. Ridenour, 623 P.2d at 1192 (Wyo. 1981).
Id. at 1191 (quoting Vroman v. Kempke, 34 Wis. 2d 680, 150 N.W.2d 423,425-26 (1967)).
Id.
Id.
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Assume that the passenger (P1) and the sober driver (P 2)
bring an action against the intoxicated driver (D). In order to
determine whether P1 can recover it is necessary to apportion
negligence among P 2 and D (the two drivers) and P himself
since his negligence in consenting to a ride with D may have
contributed to his injury. To determine whether P 2 can recover
it is only necessary to apportion negligence between P 2 and D
and compare their negligence, since Pl's actions in no way contributed to the injury P2 suffered in the collision with D. P , was
an uninvolved bystander with respect to P 2's injury.
A similar situation may arise where causation and the injury event are both distinct from, but closely related to, other
causes and injuries. The fact situation in Global Van Lines,
Inc. v. Nebeker3 0 is illustrative. A cow was struck and killed by
the driver of a semi-truck. The truck stopped, blocking the
road, and was hit by a second truck. Assume that the driver of
the second truck (P) sues the owner of the cow (D,) and the
driver of the first truck (D). All three parties are causally
negligent with respect to P's injury and negligence should be
apportioned among them to determine P's right to recover.
Should D, seek to recover the loss of his cow, P's negligence
should not be considered since P in no way contributed to the
loss of the cow. P's involvement in the mishap occurred after
the cow was struck. Therefore, D1 's right to recover should be
determined on the basis of a separate apportionment and comparison of negligence between D, and D 2 only.
The rule is that the negligence of parties to the action is
not considered for the purpose of apportioning negligence
unless the particular party's negligence has a causal connection to the injury upon which a particular claim is based.
D. Special Verdicts
Because of the complex nature of the findings necessary in
comparative negligence cases, jury verdicts take the form of
sets of interrogatories, which ask the jury to determine causa30. 541 F.2d 865, 866 (10th Cir. 1976). The hypothetical differs from the actual facts of the
case in that the owner of the cow (Nebeker) did not claim for the loss of his animal. Id.
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tion, assign percentages of negligence, and award damages. 31
Comparisons of the parties' negligence and reduction of the
damages awarded on the basis of the plaintiff's negligence are
left to the court, and are accomplished after the jury has made
32
its findings.
The most crucial consideration in drafting special verdicts
is minimizing the number of apportionments of negligence
which must be made while allowing separate apportionments
where they are dictated by causal relationships. Separate apportionments should depend upon causal relationships and not
on the various claims among the parties. Causal relationships
dictate which parties and non-parties should be included in a
given apportionment of negligence. 33 Claims among the parties dictate which comparisons will be made by the court in
molding a judgment.
The form of verdicts used in Global Van Lines, Inc. v.
Nebeker,34 although not challenged on appeal, gives a good example of how not to draft special verdicts. In that case the jury
31. The step verdict is favored in Wyoming. Distad v. Cubin, 633 P.2d 167, 179 n.10 (Wyo.
1981). The following is an example of a step verdict of the type appropriate in comparative negligence cases:
SPECIAL VERDICT
(1) Was Defendant negligent in the operation of his vehicle?
Yes__
No__
(2) Was Defendant's negligence a proximate cause of Plaintiffs injury?
Yes__
No__
If your answer to either question No. 1 or No. 2 is "NO", do not answer any further questions on this form. Inform the bailiff of your verdict.
(3) Was Plaintiff negligent in the operation of his vehicle?
Yes__
No__
(4) Was Plaintiff's negligence a proximate cause of his injury?
Yes__
No__
If your answer to either question No. 3 or No. 4 is "NO", proceed to question No. 6. Do
not answer question No. 5.
(5) Of the negligence proximately causing Plaintiff's injury, what percentage do you attribute to:
Plaintiff ,
Defendant
Total
100%
If the negligence you have assigned to Plaintiff is more than 49% do not answer question
No. 6. Inform the bailiff of your verdict.
(6) What amount of money will adequately compensate Plaintiff for his injury? Do not
consider the negligence of the parties in determining this amount.

$

32. Board of County Comm'rs v. Ridenour, 623 P.2d at 1177-78 (Wyo. 1981).
33. Ferguson v. Northern States Power Co., 307 Minn. 26, 239 N.W.2d 190, 196 (1976). That
case was cited for this proposition by the Wyoming Supreme Court in the Ridenour decision. 623 P.2d at 1190. However, the Ridenour court erroneously stated that Ferguson
involved two defendants. Id. In fact, Fergusoninvolved two plaintiffs and a single defendant. 239 N.W.2d at 191-92.
34. 542 F.2d at 866-67 (10th Cir. 1976).
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was asked to make separate apportionments of negligence
with respect to each claiming party. The jury apportioned the
negligence of the parties in five separate verdicts even though
all of the injuries were causally related. 35 The resulting problems are instructive. The verdicts were (not unexpectedly) inconsistent. More significantly, the party who appealed the trial
court's decision was denied his appeal partly because disturbing the verdict on his claim would have an unknown effect
upon the other four verdicts rendered, since not all of the parties to those verdicts were present in the appeal. These problems could, and should, have been avoided at trial by allowing
the jury to make a single apportionment of negligence among
the parties, and then molding a judgment based upon that apportionment.

36

The rule is that causal relationships, and not claims among
the parties, should dictate the number of apportionments required when drafting special verdict forms.
E. Rules Summarized
With all of the variables to consider in the cases discussed
previously, the constants are difficult to isolate. Here are a few
that appear to be important.
Comparisons are always one-on-one. Recovery is only
allowed when the claimant is less negligent than the party
from whom recovery is sought. The claimant's recovery is
reduced by the amount of his own negligence but no one else's;
therefore, if a party is liable, he is liable for the whole of the
claimant's damages reduced by the claimant's own negligence.
Causal negligence, and no other legal relationship, defines the
parties among whom negligence is apportioned. The existence
of a legal claim determines which party's negligence is relevant for purposes of comparison. Finally, a non-party actor's
negligence is relevant for no purpose other than the apportionment of negligence.
35. Id.
36. See also Beard v. Brown, 616 P.2d at 737-38 (Wyo. 1980) (two comparisons made where
one would have been sufficient).
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F. Exceptions to the Rules
If you're gonna have rules, you gotta have exceptions.
Right? Right!
Although it may be only broadly termed an exception, it is
well to note that the rule of one-on-one comparison to determine recovery has not displaced the agency principle of
respondeat superior. Therefore, if two defendants are
employer and employee their negligence may be considered
together for purposes of determining the plaintiff's right to
recover.37 In the unusual case, an employee may wear more
than one hat and as a result may have some negligence assigned to him which is not imputed to his employer. 38
Relationships other than employer-employee can result in
one party's negligence being imputed to another. Two such
relationships, those of joint economic adventurers and
automobile driver and passenger-owner, were discussed briefly by the Wyoming Supreme Court in Palmeno v. Cashen.39
Although the question was not directly addressed, it appears
that if the common law would dictate that the negligence of
one party be imputed to another in those circumstances, the
parties' negligence would be considered together for the purpose of comparison in a comparative negligence case. Minnesota has held that the negligence of joint economic adventurers should be combined for the purpose of comparison.40
In another context, Wisconsin has held, in at least two instances, that the special relationship between married plaintiffs may affect the way the rules of comparative negligence
apply. In Reber v. Hanson,4 ' the negligence of a husband and
wife was combined for the purpose of determining whether
they could recover for the wrongful death of their infant child.
The court held that "the duty to protect was joint, the oppor37. See Combined Ins. Co. of Am. v. Sinclair, 584 P.2d 1034, 1042 (Wyo. 1978); McGowan v.
Story, 70 Wis. 2d 189, 234 N.W.2d 325, 331-32 (1975).
38. Lametti v. Peter Lametti Constr. Co., 305 Minn. 72, 232 N.W.2d 435, 440 (1975). Lametti owned land upon which the construction company was doing development work,
Lametti was principle shareholder and also an employee of the construction company.
Part of Lametti's negligence was imputed to the construction company while some was
attributed to Lametti alone as owner of the land where the injury occurred. Id.
39. 627 P.2d 163, 166-67 (Wyo. 1981).
40. Krengel v. Midwest Automatic Photo, Inc., 295 Minn. 200, 203 N.W.2d 841, 846-47
(1973).
41. 260 Wis. 632, 51 N.W.2d 505 (1952).
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tunity to protect was equal, and as a matter of42law neither the
obligation nor the breach of it was divisible."
In White v. Lunder 43 the plaintiffs were also husband and
wife. The wife was injured in a boating accident and sued to
recover for her injuries. The husband sought to recover for
medical expenses paid and for loss of society. The court allowed an individual comparison of the two plaintiffs' negligence
with that of the defendant for purposes of determining the
right to recover, but reduced the amount of the husband's
recovery by the combined negligence of the husband and wife
rather than by the husband's negligence alone. The court
deemed this approach proper because the husband's cause of
action was derivative. That is, the existence of the husband's
cause of action was wholly dependent upon the existence of the
wife's cause of action. The viability of this holding is doubtful,
however, since there are overtones of an attempt to avoid an
unfair result in the decision, and the court acknowledges confusion in the precedents cited in the case.
In sum, the most likely candidates for exceptions to the
general comparative negligence rules are those cases in which
agency principles dictate considering the acts of individual parties to be done by a single entity. The probability of an excepis increased where equity would be served by
tion being made
44
exception.
the
III. CONTRIBUTION

The reader will recall that when a recovery is had against
multiple defendants under the Wyoming comparative
negligence statute, each defendant is held jointly and severally
liable for the entire judgment. A single defendant may then
have to satisfy the whole judgment. The contribution statutes
provide a method for equitable distribution of the burden of the
judgment by creating a cause of action, against his fellow tortfeasors, in favor of one who pays more than his share of the
judgment.4 5
42. Id., 51 N.W.2d at 508.
43. 66 Wis. 563, 225 N.W.2d 442 (1975).

44. See WYO. STAT. § 1-1-111(aXii) (1977) (allows negligence to be combined where equity requires for purposes of contribution).
45. WYO. STAT. S 1-1-110(b) (1977).
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The right exists against one who is a tortfeasor and the
Wyoming Supreme Court has defined "tortfeasor" as one who
is liable in tort. 46 Therefore, a defendant whose negligence is
not greater than the plaintiff's is not liable, is not a tortfeasor,
and he may not be held liable for contribution. Similarly, an
employer or employee who cannot be held liable because of
workman's compensation immunity cannot be held liable for
7
contribution.

4

Note that although one found not liable to the injured party as a matter of law can not be held liable for contribution, the
converse is not true. One need not be found liable to the injured
party to be held liable for contribution. The contribution
statutes provide that a defendant who satisfies a judgment will
have a cause of action for contribution against non-party actors and that he may bring a separate action to recover contribution. 48 The non-party actor may be found liable for con-

tribution in a separate action without ever incurring a legal
liability to the original plaintiff in the action. A similar situation may arise where one party settles the whole of the plaintiff's claim against all of the named defendants. The issue of
liability to the original plaintiff may never be tried at all in an
action where he is a party. 49 This situation will be discussed in
more detail in the section on settlements infra.
The Wyoming contribution statutes are generally comparable to the provisions of the 1955 Uniform Contribution
Act,5 ° with one significant exception. The section of the
Wyoming Act that provides for the method of determining
tortfeasors' pro rata shares for purposes of contribution
adopts percentage contribution. 51 The statute provides that
46. ABC Builders, Inc. v. Phillips, 632 P.2d at 934 (Wyo. 1981).
47. Shields v. Bechtel Power Corp., 439 F. Supp. 192, 194-95 (D. Wyo. 1077); Cottonwood
Steel Corp. v. Hansen, 655 P.2d 1226, 1235-37 (Wyo. 1982).
48. WYo. STAT. S 1-1-112(a) (1977); Maloney Concrete Co. v. D.C. Transit Sys., Inc., 241 Md.
420, 216 A.2d 895 &1966).
49. Wyo. STAT. S 1-1-112(d) (1977). See Cottonwood Steel Corp. v. Hansen, 655 P.2d 1226
(Wyo. 1982); Lametti v. Peter Lametti Constr. Co., 232 N.W.2d 435 (1975).
50. UNIF. CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT, 12 U.L.A. 63 (1975).
51. WYO. STAT. S 1-1-1 11(aXi) (1977). No complicated mathematics are needed to determine

the dollar amounts of the pro rata shares. Simply taking each defendant's percentage of
negligence times the dollar amount of the total damages before reduction by the
plaintiff's negligence gives the correct dollar amount of the defendants' liability for contribution. Assume the following apportionment of negligence: P-10%; DI-35%; D,-55%.
Also assume P's total damages before reduction are $23,000.
P's recovery = $23,000 -($23,000 x .10) = $20,700
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each tortfeasor will be liable for contribution in an amount based upon his relative degree of negligence in causing the injuries which were sued upon in the original action. 52 This
change from the provisions of the uniform act is important in
those cases where the plaintiff in an action against multiple
defendants is found not negligent as a matter of law. Since the
plaintiff is not negligent, comparative negligence is not at
issue, but because the defendant's rights to contribution depend upon their relative degrees of fault, the jury must still apportion negligence among the defendants.53 In this context
negligence must be apportioned even though no comparison is
necessary to determine recovery by the plaintiff.
Tortfeasors have a right to contribution only for that
amount which they have actually paid out in excess of their pro
rata share of the judgment. 54 The individual's liability for contribution cannot exceed his share of the judgment. 55 There is
no right to contribution in favor of one who has been found to
have acted willfully or wantonly in causing the plaintiff's injuries.5 6 Therefore, there can be no right to contribution for
punitive damages. If a separate action is brought to enforce
contribution, that action must be brought within one year after
the judgment in the original tort action becomes final. 57 Contribution will not apply where one defendant has a recognized
58
right to indemnity from the other.
Finally, it should not be overlooked that contribution may
be enforced against parties in the original action by judgment,

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

57.
58.

DI's pro rata share = $23,000 x .35 = $8,050
D2's pro rata share = $23,000 x .55 = $12,650
The same figures result if the defendants' pro rata shares are calculated as a fraction of
the plaintiff's recovery.
Di's pro rata share = 35/90 x $20,700 = $8,050
D,'s pro rata share = 55/90 x $20,700 = $12,650
Wyo. STAT. S 1-1-111(aXi) (1977).
Chrysler Corp. v. Todorovich, 580 P.2d 1123, 1127 (Wyo. 1978).
WYo. STAT. S 1-1-110(b) (1977).
WYO. STAT. S 1-1-110(b) (1977).
WYo. STAT. S 1-1-110(c) (1977).
WYo. STAT. S 1-1-112(c) (1977).
Wyo. STAT. S 1-1-110(f) (1977). Indemnity is a right to reimbursement for the whole of
the judgment amount which arises out of contract or some special relationship between
the indemnitor and indemnitee. Contribution is a right only to a share of the judgment
amount which occurs by virtue of one defendant having paid another defendant's share in
the judgment, The right to contrribution did not prevail at common law. PROSSER, LAW
OF TORTS SS 50, 51 (4th ed. 1971).
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following motion and notice to all parties. 59 This gives the
defendant, who believes he should not be solely liable to the
plaintiff, a powerful incentive to join other defendants. He can
then enforce his right to contribution without the expense,
delay, and uncertainty of a separate action.
A hypothetical may be useful in bringing all of this into
perspective. Assume that P sues D 1 , D 2 and D 3 . A fourth person, NPA, is not named as a defendant. The jury apportions
negligence as follows: P-10%, D 1-5%, D 2-20%, D 3 -20%, and
NPA-45%.
Since D 1 is not liable to P as a matter of law, no other
defendant can have a right of contribution against him. D 2 and
D 3 should move for cross judgments in the original action, based upon their respective rights to contribution from each
other. If D 2 satisfies the judgment, he can recover an amount
equal to D3 's share of the liability from D3 . D2 must then bring
a separate action against NPA to recover contribution from
him. Since NPA was not a party to the original action, he is not
bound by the percentage of negligence assigned him in that action. To determine NPA's liability for contribution, the jury in
D 2 's action against NPA will have to apportion negligence
among NPA and the parties to the original action. NPA will
then be liable to D 2 for contribution based upon the percentage
of negligence assigned to NPA in the second action. Since D 2 's
right to contribution is limited to the amount over his share
which he has paid to satisfy the original judgment, NPA cannot
be liable for any amount greater than that which D 2 has paid
out above his pro rata share. NPA may, however, be liable for
a lesser amount, since he is not bound by the outcome of the
first action. The second action determines only NPA's liability
to D 2 . Collateral estoppel precludes the relitigation of other
issues which were determined in the original action by P
against D 1, D 2 , and D 3 .
But, the reader may ask, "What would happen if NPA
wasn't a party to the first action because he had settled with
P?" That burning question is considered in the next section.
59. WYo. STAT. S 1-1-112(b) (1977).
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IV. SETTLEMENT

The entire thrust of the statutes relating to settlements is
to encourage settlement. Advantages to the settling party are
maximized; disadvantages to the plaintiff are minimized.
The party who settles is unconditionally relieved of all
liability for contribution to any other tortfeasor.60 But, if the
settlement extinguishes the liability of the other tortfeasors,
the settlor retains a right to contribution from the non-settling
tortfeasors. 61 The release reduces the claim against the nonsettling tortfeasors to the extent provided in the release or in
the amount paid for it, whichever is greater.62 Therefore, if the
amount paid for the settlement is greater than the judgment
eventually received, the judgment will always be satisfied by
the settlement. The settling party cannot be placed in the position of having satisfied the entire judgment but of having no
right to contribution because he was credited only with having
satisfied his pro rata share under the terms of the settlement.
The settling party cannot, however, recover excessive
amounts paid for the settlement.63
If the judgment is satisfied by the amount paid for the settlement, i.e., reduced to zero by the amount of consideration
paid for the release, the settling party must bring his action for
contribution under the terms, and within the limitations, of
section 1-1-112(d) of the Wyoming Statutes. 64 The action for
contribution may be brought against both parties and non65
parties to the original action.
As regards the plaintiff, the settlement will not discharge
anyone other than the tortfeasor to whom it is given unless its
terms so provide. 66 Proper drafting will insure that the plain60. WYo. STAT. S 1-1-113(aXii) (1977).
61. Wyo. STAT. 5 1-1-110(d) (1977); WYo. STAT. 5 1-1-112(d) (1977). For differing views on
whether satisfaction of a judgent is extinguishment of liability for purposes of section
1-1-110(d), see Mong v. Hershberger, 200 Pa. Super. 68, 186 A.2d 427 (1962), and Best
Sanitary Dist. Co. v. Little Food Town, Inc., 339 So.2d 222 (Fla. 1976). The issue has not

been decided in Wyoming. However, the equitable purpose of the contribution statutes is
best served if satisfaction of a judgment is considered to be the equivalent of extinguishing liability. The hypothetical used by this author to illustrate the effect of a settlement assumes this approach.
62. WYO.STAT. S 1-1-113(aXi) (1977).

63. WYo. STAT. S 1-1-110(d) (1977).
64. WYO. STAT. S 1-1-112(d) (1977).
65. Wyo. STAT. S 1-1-112(e) (1977).
66. WYO. STAT. J 1-1-113(aXi) (1977).
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tiffs claim against the other defendants in his action will never
be reduced by an amount greater than that he receives for the
settlement.6 7 Any amount the plaintiff receives over and above
what his judgment ultimately is determined to be is the plaintiff's to keep. For the plaintiff, settlement has no hidden pitfalls other than the usual unknowns and undeterminables.
Once again, a hypothetical is in order. Assume P brings an
action against D 1 and D 2 . D1 settles for $15,000. The agreement provides only that D1 is released from all liability for his
pro rata share of P's damages. P pursues his action against D 2
where P's damages are determined to be $10,000. The judgment, reduced by the greater of D 1 's pro rata share or $15,000,
is reduced to zero. Since D 1 has satisfied the judgment he can
bring an action against D 2 for contribution. D 2 's liability is
limited to the lesser of his pro rata share as determined in the
first action (his maximum liability for contribution) and Di's
pro rata share as determined in the second action (D1 's maximum right to contribution).
If the release obtained by D 1 had also released D 2 , so that
P had given up his whole cause of action, D, could still bring an
action for contribution against D2 . The jury in that action
would apportion negligence among P, D 1 and D 2, and D 2 would
be liable to D, for contribution in the amount of his (D2 's) pro
rata share of the settlement. This may seem unfair, but in
practice D 2,is likely to fare better in an action by D 1 than in an
action by P. D, has, for practical purposes, obtained a right of
subrogation to P's cause of action, but the amount D1 may
recover is limited by the amount of the settlement. Further, D 2
may be better able to defend an action brought by D, than he
could an action brought by the injured plaintiff. The jury is less
likely to be influenced by a desire to dole out compensation
when neither party has been injured by another's negligence.
67. This construction of the statute gives the plaintiff a good deal of flexibility in structuring

his lawsuit. Given the right circumstances, he can, if he chooses, place the defendants in
pPrOximately the same position they would have been in under the common law. The

intiff can maintain his action against the defendant of his choice and obtain a full
recovery, while relieving other defendants of all liability through the giving of a
settlement.
Although this seems to be a significant and perhaps unfair advantage for the plaintiff,
in practice there is no advantage in the great majority of cases. The plaintiff can be expected to make a bona fide effort to recover from every defendant, except in unusual
cases such as those in which a potential defendant is a member of the plaintiffs
immediate family.
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Finally, a note of caution is appropriate with regard to the
interpretation of the Wyoming statutes on contribution and,
especially, settlement. As was mentioned earlier, the contribution and settlement statutes underwent significant changes in
1977.68 Since the 1977 amendment had no retroactive effect,
cases involving causes of action that arose prior to the amendment's effective date are of little precedential value in interpreting the current statutes.6 9 In fact, cases applying to the
pre-amendment statutes may be misleading in some
instances. 0
V. COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE AND TORT CONCEPTS

A. TraditionalAffirmative Defenses
The affirmative defenses of contributory negligence and
last clear chance were dispatched from Wyoming tort law in
short order following the adoption of comparative negligence.
The Wyoming courts had never recognized a difference between the two defenses, and since contributopry negligence
was replaced by comparative negligence by the terms of the
statute, assumption of risk was afortiori also replaced. 71 The
doctrine of last clear chance followed without fanfare72 and it
appeared that affirmative defenses other than comparative
negligence were to be a thing of the past in Wyoming. But the
next likely candidate for interment with the other old defenses
proved to have a surprisingly good grip on life.
In Sherman v. Platte County7 3 the Wyoming Supreme
Court held that the obvious danger rule would continue as a
complete bar to the plaintiff's recovery in tort actions. The
court distinguished obvious danger from assumption of risk,
stating that the obvious danger rule goes only to the defen74
dant's duty and does not concern the plaintiff's negligence.
The court reasoned that since obvious danger operates by
68. 1977 Wyo. SESS. LAWS Ch. 188, S 1.

69. Board of County Comm'rs v. Ridenour, 623 P,2d at 1193-94 (Wyo. 1981) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting); Johnson v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 568 P.2d 908 (Wyo. 1977).
70. Board of County Comm'rs v. Ridenour, 623 P.2d at 1177 (Wyo. 1981), is especially confusing in this regard since the supreme court relates the trial court's interpretation of
WYO. STAT. S 1-7.5 (Supp. 1975), but cites the new section WYO. STAT. S 1-1-113 (1977).
71. Barnette v. Doyle, 622 P.2d 1349, 1361 (Wyo. 1981); Brittain v. Booth, 601 P.2d at 534
(Wyo. 1979).
72. Danculovich v. Brown, 593 P.2d 187, 195 (Wyo. 1979).
73. 642 P.2d 787 (Wyo. 1982).
74. Id. at 789-90.
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relieving the defendant of any duty (and therefore negligence)
and not, as does assumption of risk, by placing fault with the
plaintiff, comparative negligence does not replace the obvious
danger defense. The distinction is a difficult one, and the two
doctrines (obvious danger and assumption of risk) blend quite
nicely at their edges. 7, A situation in which the injured party
willingly encounters a known hazard might, without more, fit
within either defense. As a practical matter, what
distinguishes assumption of risk and obvious danger is the
defendant's status in the latter case as a possessor or occupier
of land. The Wyoming Supreme Court, by preserving the obvious danger rule, has simply continued the protection which
that rule has traditionally afforded landowners under the common law. The availability of the defense should not be
overlooked by defense counsel.76 Presumably, obvious danger
ought to be specially pleaded apart from the defense of comparative negligence, while those defenses that have been
merged into comparative negligence need not be pleaded
separately from comparative negligence.
B. Gross Negligence
For purposes of most tort actions, gross negligence no
longer exists in Wyoming. At common law a plaintiff's contributory negligence would bar recovery when the defendant
was grossly negligent.77 Gross negligence differs only in
degree, and not in kind, from ordinary negligence; therefore, it
may be compared with the ordinary negligence of another party under the comparative negligence statute.7 8 Since comparison is possible there is no need to distinguish gross
79
negligence.
In a rather interesting extension of this reasoning the
Wyoming Supreme Court has held that contract provisions
limiting liability to acts constituting gross negligence are void
as against public policy. In Tate v. Mountain States Telephone
75. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS SS 343A, 463 (1965); Note, Assumption of Risk and
the Obvious DangerRule. Primaryor Secondary Assumption of Risk? 18 LAND & WATER
L. REV. 373 (1983).
76. See Buttrey Food Stores Div. v. Coulson, 620 P.2d 549 (Wyo. 1980) (earlier case in which
the obvious danger defense might have been appropriate but was apparently not raised).
77. PROSSER, supra note 58, S 65.
78. Danculovich v. Brown, 593 P.2d at 192-93 (Wyo. 1979).
79. Id.
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and Telegraph Company,80 the court reasoned that the
legislature, by enacting the comparative negligence statute,
had expressed an intent to have negligence compared in all actions where contributory negligence was alleged. That intent
is frustrated by contract provisions that allow comparison only
when the jury finds gross negligence on the part of the defendant."' The court construed such a provision to be an attempt
to change the policy set by the legislature for determining the
82
existence of liability, rather than an attempt to limit liability.
The court did not elaborate on the basis for the distinction,
although to do so would certainly have been helpful. It would
seem that an attempt by a private party to set a standard for
determining the existence of liability is, in fact, an attempt to
limit liability. The distinction is semantic only.
The Tate decision will undoubtedly cause discomfiture
among those who draft contracts. The holding places draftsmen in an all-or-nothing situation when attempting to limit
liability for negligence. As a practical matter the alternatives
will be to disclaim all liability for any negligent act, i.e. accept
liability only for willful misconduct, or forego completely the
attempt to limit liability. The first alternative is fraught with
uncertainty with respect to its acceptance by the courts and
the second yields no protection. An unnecessary burden is
created on the freedom to contract. Perhaps skillful drafting
can overcome the problem, at least in form. Whether the
courts will then lend substance to the form is uncertain.
Gross negligence is of course alive and well, and given due
recognition where the term appears in the statutes.8 3 Since the
use of the term in the statutes has the backing of legislative
authority it is presumably irrelevant whether it limits liability
or sets policy.
C. Willful Misconduct and Punitive Damages
Having dispensed with gross negligence, but not wishing
to follow Wisconsin by also doing away with punitive damages
in negligence cases, the Wyoming court determined to con80.
81.
82.
83.

647 P.2d 58, 61 (Wyo. 1982).
Id.
Id.
Danculovich v. Brown, 593 P.2d at 192-93 n.6 (Wyo. 1979).
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tinue to make punitive damages available in cases where
willful and wanton misconduct was proved.8 4 Willful and wanton misconduct has been preserved as a standard on the
rationale that it is different in kind from ordinary or gross
negligence.85 A willful act is done intentionally (although the
resulting injury might not be intended) when the act should not
have been done, whereas a negligent act is done
inadvertently. 6 Because of this difference in kind, damages
resulting from willful misconduct are determined not to be
"damages for negligence" as that term is used in the comparative negligence statute.8 7 Therefore, when willful misconduct is proved, the comparative negligence statute does not apply and there is no reduction of the plaintiff's recovery on the
basis of his negligence.8 8
In more recent cases the court has discussed the procedure
to be used when punitive damages are sought. In Barmette v.
Doyle the court stated that the jury should first apportion
negligence as is done in the usual comparative negligence case.
If the defendant is determined to be more negligent than the
plaintiff, the jury then determines whether the defendant's
conduct was willful and wanton.8 9 If that question is determined in favor of the plaintiff, he may recover punitive damages,
and his compensatory damages are not reduced by his own
negligence. This procedure dovetails nicely with the bifurcated
punitive damages procedure prescribed in Campen v. Stone.90
Under that procedure, compensatory damages are determined
first and punitive damages second.
In an unusual case this procedure may work to the plaintiff's disadvantage. Apportioning negligence as the first step
may bar the plaintiff's recovery even though the defendant's
conduct was willful. This could happen when the defendant's
willful misconduct is only remotely responsible for the plaintiff's injury. For practical purposes the plaintiff is denied a
84. Id. at 194 n.10. Wisconsin has since retreated from this position. Wangen v. Ford Motor
Co., 97 Wis. 2d 260, 294 N.W.2d 437, 446 (1980).
85. Danculovich v. Brown, 593 P.2d at 193 (Wyo. 1979).
86. Id. (quoting Mitchell v. Walters, 55 Wyo. 317, 100 P.2d 102, 106-07 (1940)).
87. Danculovich v. Brown, 593 P.2d at 194 (Wyo. 1979).
88. Id.
89. 622 P.2d 1349, 1361-62 (Wyo. 1981).
90. 635 P.2d 1121, 1131-32 (Wyo. 1981).
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recovery on the basis of a comparison between his ordinary
negligence and the defendant's willful misconduct, even
though such a comparison is eschewed by the courts. The better approach would be to first determine whether the defendant's conduct was willful. If it is, apportioning negligence can
be avoided altogether. Determining the character of the defendant's conduct first does no harm in any case since the jury can
later be allowed to apportion negligence if both parties' conduct constitutes only ordinary negligence.
Although the terms "gross negligence" and "willful
misconduct" are easily distinguished, and their meanings and
lineage are relatively clear, the legislature has, in at least one
important context, chosen to forsake them in favor of a
bastard child called "culpable negligence." Wyoming's
workmen's compensation law91 provides that employees may
sue fellow employees only if they are culpably negligent.
The supreme court has defined culpable negligence as
"willful and serious misconduct. ' 92 This would seem to make
culpable negligence different in kind from ordinary negligence
in the same way that willful and wanton misconduct is different in kind from ordinary negligence. Yet the court persists
in using the "culpable negligence" terminology.9 3 The
nomenclature is confusing, and the issue has apparently not
been raised, but it appears that culpable negligence is not
negligence at all for purposes of comparative negligence. One
culpably negligent should therefore be treated as one whose
conduct was willful and wanton and should be liable for a plaintiff's entire damages regardless of the plaintiff's causal
negligence.
D. Miscellaneous Matters
Finally, there are a few odds and ends that should be noted
because they are potentially important and because completeness requires their mention. In comparative negligence
actions summary judgments are not favored. However they
are appropriate, as usual, where one party may be found not
91. WYO. STAT. S 27-12-103(a) (1977).
92. Barnette v. Doyle, 622 P.2d at 1362 (Wyo. 1981).
93. See Meyer v. Kendig, 641 P.2d 1235, 1238 (Wyo. 1982).
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negligent or not liable as a matter of law. 94 Where one party,
such as an employer protected by workmen's compensation, is
granted summary judgment because he may not be held liable,
he should nevertheless appear on the verdict form for purposes
of the jury's apportionment of negligence. 5 However, a party
who is granted summary judgment because he is found not
negligent as a matter of law should not appear on the verdict
form since the jury may not properly assign any negligence to
96
him.
At trial, multiple defendants will, in almost all
cases, have
adverse interests because of the effect that shifting negligence
from one to the other will have on the final outcome of the
case. For this reason, each defendant should normally be entitled to a full compliment of peremptory challenges during
jury selection.97
When the case does go to the jury, the jury must be instructed as to the effect of its determinations of percentages of
negligence.9 8 Obviously, it would be inappropriate and perhaps
futile to attempt to inform the jury of all of the consequences
of its assignments of negligence in a complex lawsuit. A brief
instruction explaining that a party can recover only when his
negligence is less than the negligence of the party from whom
recovery is sought should be sufficient to meet the instruction
requirement in all cases.
On appeal, the reviewing court cannot render a decision
that simply alters the apportionment of negligence between
the parties. Apportionment is a basic question of fact which is
properly considered only by the trial court or jury.99 Because
of the importance apportionment has upon the rights and
liabilities of all of the parties in a comparative negligence case,
an appellate court should consider the interests of all parties
when error is alleged. An error which might be considered
harmless, in that it would not change the basic outcome of the
94. Connett v. Fremont County School Dist., 581 P.2d 1097, 1100 (Wyo. 1978); Combined
Ins. Co. of Am. v. Sinclair, 584 P.2d at 1051 (Wyo. 1978).
95. Beard v. Brown, 616 P.2d at 738 (Wyo. 1980).
96. ABC Builders, Inc. v. Phillips, 632 P.2d at 933 (Wyo. 1981).
97. Distad v. Cubin, 633 P.2d at 171 (Wyo. 1981).
98. Wyo. STAT. S 1-1-109(bXiii) (1977).
99. Buttrey Food Stores Div. v. Coulson, 620 P.2d at 553 (Wyo. 1980).
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case, may nevertheless have important impacts upon the
relative rights and obligations of the parties. 10 0
IV. CONCLUSION

Comparative negligence is an evolving area of the law.
That evolution is presently in its early stages in this state; the
process is more advanced in such states as Wisconsin and Minnesota, which have systems similar to Wyoming's. The law
must, in the nature of things, evolve differently in Wyoming
than in any other jurisdiction. However, the Wyoming
Supreme Court has infused the law of this state with genetic
material from the population of caselaw in other states,
especially Wisconsin. Evolution without isolation should avoid
the development of a strain of negligence law as unique and
different as Australia's marsupials. Therefore, the case law of
other states that have followed the Wisconsin approach to
comparative negligence should continue to provide relevant
background for the interpretation of Wyoming's comparative
negligence law.
Wyoming's attorneys will play a vital role in the development of comparative negligence law in their state. Bad appeals
make bad law. They are radioactive fallout in the process of
legal evolution. The practitioners of the bar and bench in
Wyoming can insure the development of a fair and responsive
negligence system by being informed and able in the area of
comparative negligence. It is this author's sincere hope that
the foregoing paper will prove to be a positive force in the
development of comparative negligence in Wyoming.
ROGER FRANSEN

100. COMBINED INS. CO. OF AM. V. SINCLAIR, 584 P.2D AT 1054-55 (Wyo. 1978) (THOMAS, J.,
DISSENTING).
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